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ABSTRACT 
This paper will present an argument in support of the Extended Mind Hypothe-
sis (EMH). The argument consists of two sub-arguments, an evolutionary and a 
systematic one. The evolutionary sub-argument advances that there is good 
empirical and analytic reason to suppose that the mind is designed by natural 
selection to extend. The systematic states that EMH is more consistent with the 
current system of science and scientific taxonomy. In force of the connection 
between these sub-arguments, I will conclude that EMH is epistemically advan-
tageous compared to purely internalist accounts of cognition. Furthermore, this 
essay situates EMH in a broader landscape of philosophical and scientific ideas 
and theories about the mind.  
1. EMH AND ACTIVE EXTERNALISM 
The Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) is the view according to which it is 
arbitrary to state that the mind is only contained within the boundaries of the 
nervous system. Rather, it may extend to objects and processes whose local 
position is outside the nervous system.23 Advocates of the EMH refer indeed 
to a challenging notion of mentality that addresses the question as to the 
division point between the mind, the body and the environment by promot-
ing the view of Active Externalism.24 
                       
23 Traditional EMH definitions are used to bring up the division point of the brain in place of 
the nervous system. For example, Clark & Chalmers (1998) notoriously presented EMH 
through the slogan «cognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head». However this is a very liberal 
description, that virtually all neuroscientists would agree with, for none of them would doubt 
extra-brainy tissues such as the cerebellum, the spinal chord and the optic and olfactory 
nerves to actively drive cognition. In my view, therefore, the challenging issue here is 
whether or not the mind may extend to components outside the nervous system and even 
outside the organism itself. 




Active Externalism (AE) is the view that proposes that external factors 
may play an active role in driving cognitive processes. It is easy to note how 
this view and the EMH are strictly related. AE implies that some objects or 
processes in the external environment are integrated by the mind’s infor-
mation processing in such a way that actively drives the functioning of the 
mind itself. EMH moves a step further and says that, due to their active role 
in driving cognitive processes, such external objects or processes can be seen 
as extensions of the mind itself. For this reason, advocates of EMH claim 
that the mind may also integrate bodily and environmental components, and 
call the resulting integrated system Extended Mind (EM).25  
An easy way to appreciate EMH is taking into account the traditional 
mind-computer functional analogy, but in an upgraded form. The classical 
version of the analogy says that the mind/nervous system relation resembles 
the relation between a personal computer hardware and a system software: 
the nervous system, on the one hand, is hardware, i.e. the physical part of the 
computer; the mind, on the other hand, is software, i.e. a set of programs and 
related data installed in the hardware in order to provide instructions for the 
hardware to accomplish tasks. The upgraded version of the analogy, which I 
call Upgraded Functional Analogy (UFA), basically accepts the classical 
analogy but stresses that human minds and nervous systems are respectively 
software and hardware of a very particular kind for they always have active 
interface. According to EMH, indeed, the nervous system is not like an 
ordinary computer, such as the one I am using to write this paper. Rather, it 
is like a special computer whose motherboard is constantly connected with 
many other computer and peripheral devices through integrated circuitry 
(such as chipsets, RAMs, BIOSs, ROMs, internal and external buses, periph-
eral storage devices etc.).26 
In fact, in conformity with its commitment to AE, EMH refuses to view 
the nervous system as a closed circuitry. Rather, the nervous system is seen 
as a system constantly having active interfaces that keep it connected to 
                       
25 Note that AE and EMH are not biunivocally related. Their relation is rather univocal: one 
might accept AE and nevertheless deny EMH; instead one might not consistently accept 
EMH and deny AE. This relational univocity will be further stressed later on. 
26 According to a classical definition, a hardware interface is described by the mechanical, 
electrical and logical signals at the interface and the protocol for sequencing them (Blaauw 
et. Al., 1997). Obviously the devices should not be always of the same kind, nor there should 
be a defined number of connected devices. Rather they might change in quality and quantity 
over time and local position of the computer, as the things that the mind interacts with also 
change in quality and quantity over time and local position of the brain. What counts for the 
sake of the analogy is that there is no time in which the computer is completely unplugged, 
as there is no time in the lifetime of an organism in which its brain is a closed circuitry and 
the mind does not interact at all. 




other bodily components and the environment.27 
Just as the nervous system has hardware interfaces, so the mind, in con-
formity with this view, must have software interfaces. Just as in a PC appli-
cations and programs running on the operating system may interact via 
streams or methods (and, in the online mode, also with the Internet), so the 
mind interacts both with other minds and with programs running on the 
external environment. Consider, for example, two people having an argu-
ment, or a student using a calculator to solve an arithmetical operation. In 
both cases the mind has an active software interface with external processes 
and interacts with them: in the former case we have a mind-mind interaction 
through the language program; in the second case the calculation program 
running in the student's mind interacts with an external calculation program 
installed on the calculating machine. 
For EMH proponents, interactions of this kind characterize our overall 
cognitive life and can be found far and wide in our world. For instance, 
consider the case of a market trader writing on a slip of paper her customers' 
numbers, a child counting on her fingers, a girl using Google Maps on her 
iPhone to reach a certain place, a student writing down conceptual schemata 
to better succeed in the exam. In all these cases the mind establishes an 
interaction with some external objects (the slip of paper, the iPhone etc.) by 
running some programs that, through software interfaces, are capable to go 
across the mind and the external objects themselves. In order that such a 
process can run, external objects must get integrated within the same cogni-
tive loop of the mind. This does not require only software interfaces; instead, 
also the physical interfaces of the nervous system and, to a certain extent, of 
the rest of the body, are likely to be used. The whole process resambles how 
a computer integrates external software and peripheral devices in its circuitry 
by means of both software and hardware interfaces. 
On the grounds of this general view, advocates of EMH address the fol-
lowing question: given that the mind interacts with objects in the environ-
ment and integrates them within the mind's processing loop, do these 
external objects count as extensions of the mind? 
In the light of the analogy presented above, the most plausible answer 
seems to be “yes, they do”. In fact, it seems difficult to deny that if you 
connect your computer to an external device, the device does not become an 
extension of the computer. For example, if I connect a 3 TB hard disk drive 
to the 320 GB HDD laptop I am using to write this paper, I obtain an in-
                       
27 The easiest way to appreciate this is looking at the connection between the brain and the 
rest of the body: hundreds of thousands of complex neural pathways interconnect the brain 
with all other bodily regions, such as with the circulatory and the muscular system, and, 




crease of approximately 10³ in the original computer memory. Such a mas-
sively increased memory seems to be a property of the whole integrated 
system (computer + hard disk drive), and not of only one component. 
Suppose I want to store somewhere the complete collection of Stanley 
Kubrick’s movies and there is no sufficient space on my internal hard disk, 
so that I have no option but to use the external drive. In such a case, the data 
storage process can be executed only by the integrated system constituted 
both by the computer and the drive. The computer alone could not execute it, 
for it would not have sufficient memory space. And the drive would never be 
able to go without the computer in running the memory process.28 In order to 
execute the process, computer and drive cannot be decoupled. This implies 
that such a process, namely the memory storage of Kubrick collection, is not 
a function of the sole computer, but rather of the entire computer-drive 
coupled system.29 Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that, in such kind 
of cases, the external drive becomes part of the computer, or, put it different-
ly, that the computer extends to the drive. It is worth to point out that this is a 
definition computer scientists widely agree upon without big theoretical 
problems. Indeed in computer science, to say that plugged-in peripheral 
devices are parts of the computer, and interfaced softwares −while executing 
the function for which they are interfaced− are parts of the running program, 
are both ordinary expressions.30 Furthermore, files containing programming 
that serves to expand the capabilities of or data available to a more basic 
program, are typically called software extensions. Taking UFA seriously, 
advocates of EMH argue that, insofar as the computer extends, there is no 
theoretical impediment to claim that the mind also extends to the rest of the 
body and the environment. 
1.1. Historical roots 
Seen through the lenses of the history of ideas, AE −and to some extent 
EMH too− have deep historical-philosophical roots. The idea that the exter-
nal environment may play an active role in driving cognitive processes 
characterizes two central perspectives in 20th century philosophy: Merleau-
                       
28 As suggested in the book 101 Uses for a Dead Computer, the best possible use for an 
unplugged hard drive is probably that as table tennis paddle. 
29 It is worth to point out that not every coupling can be considered an extension of the 
original processing unit. As Clark & Chalmers (1997, p. 6) put it, «for coupled systems to be 
relevant to the core of cognition, reliable coupling is required». How a reliable coupling 
should look like will be discussed in the next sections. 
30 See for example the entry “Extension“ on Webopedia: <webopedia.com>. 




Ponty’s theory of perception and Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. 
In his “Phenomenology of Perception”, the French philosopher questions 
the existence of a clear-cut separation line between the body’s interaction 
with the world and the cognitive dimension. Repudiating any purely cogni-
tivist ontology of the mind, purely gnoseological description of the self and 
the late-Platonic idea of mind-body dualism, Merleau-Ponty described the 
“lived body” as the unity of what he called “a mind-body-world system”. In 
his view, the “lived body” is better characterized as a complex system where 
the cognitive dimension of experience (including consciousness) are embed-
ded in the body. In Merleau-Ponty’s words: “My body is the pivot of the 
world: I know that objects have several facets because I could make a tour of 
inspection of them, and in that sense, I am conscious of the world through 
the medium of my body”.31 On these grounds, Merleau-Ponty hypothesized 
that body alterations may affect a person’s phenomenal experience.32 
Similarly, in Husserl’s phenomenology, humans are seen to perceive, un-
derstand and interact with the world as “embodied subjects” (Husserl, 1950). 
The body as described by Husserl is neither internal to consciousness nor 
external to the subject in the environment, it is neither subject nor object, 
rather it is “a thing ‘inserted’ between the rest of the material world and the 
‘subjective’ sphere” (Husserl, 1950). Through these lenses, the body be-
comes the instrument that orientates humans through their experience of the 
world and cannot be easily decoupled from the mind.  
It is worth noting that, according to Husserl’s phenomenology, the body 
is not understood as the objective and material body (in German, Körper) but 
rather as the subjective body (Leib). Such subjective body is seen as some-
thing that constantly and actively interacts with the external world (Walsh, 
2017). Wherever there is a body, there is a personal interaction with the 
world. This notion of body as Leib can be dated back to Friedrich Nie-
tzsche’s Also Sprach Zarathustra, where it was used to highlight the poietic 
function of the body in shaping subjective experience. In a section called 
“The Despisers of the Body”, Zarathustra argues: “Ego, sayest thou, and art 
proud of that word. But the greater thing—in which thou art unwilling to 
believe—is thy body with its big sagacity; it saith not "ego," but doeth it 
(Nietzsche, 1914). 
This historically stratified philosophical stance was imported into the 
cognitive sciences through the contemporary philosophy of mind, as several 
authors have characterized the “lived body” as “the way the body structures 
our experience” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007). Phenomenological accounts of 
cognition have found support in two specific accounts of AE called, respec-
                       
31 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). 




tively, embodied cognition and environmental cognition. According to the 
embodied framework, “cognition is deeply dependent upon features of the 
physical body of an agent” (Wilson & Foglia, 2011). Proponents of ecologi-
cal cognition, in contrast, highlight the active role of environmental factors. 
2. THREE OBJECTIONS AGAINST EMH 
EMH was originally formulated at the end of the '90s by two philosophers, 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers, and obtained a certain success among 
philosophers sympathetic to an externalist account in theory of meaning.33 In 
contrast, it was often challenged by philosophers of mind confident of the 
existence of an intrinsic content of mental states.34 The uptake of EMH in the 
mind and brain science also appears quite limited. Indeed, the default brain-
centric position in neuroscience is that there is a well-defined system respon-
sible for cognition, to virtually the same extent to which there is a well-
defined system, the cardiovascular, responsible for blood distribution. This 
system is the nervous system. Extra-neural systems might, under certain 
circumstances, play a causal role but they do not become constitutive of 
cognition or any other brain-enabled function.35 
 But why this hostility? If, in the language of computer science, pe-
ripheral devices connected to a computer do count as extensions of the 
computer, and programs interfaced with the computer do count as extensions 
of the computer operating program, why does not go the same for brains and 
minds?  
The most instinctive objection is that simply showing that computers 
seem to extend to external components, still does not say much about wheth-
er also the mind extends. This objection has some appeal. The upgraded 
analogy, indeed, is just an analogy, and analogies must not always be taken 
seriously. For example, molecular biology handbooks often present the 
process of creating a complementary RNA copy of a sequence of DNA 
through the analogy with graphic code transcription. But such an analogy is 
only used for explanatory aims, without any commitment to the view that 
what is true for graphic code transcription must be necessarily true for DNA 
transcription too. And for sure no geneticist working on transcription would 
                       
33 Externalism about meaning, also called semantic externalism, is the view that the meaning 
of a term is determined, in whole or in part, by factors external to the speaker. See Putnam 
(1975). 
34 See Adams & Aizawa (2001), Aizawa (2009). 
35 It is easy to note that the default position in neuroscience, though apparently in contradic-
tion with the EMH, is manifestly compatible with AE.  




consult a code compiler. But simply answering that way would just mean 
begging the question, for the salient problem here is precisely why UFA 
should not be taken seriously. Opponents of EMH, therefore, use to enforce 
this intuitive objection by advocating the three following arguments against 
UFA and the EMH:36 
A. Computers and their extensions have, to a certain extent, a similar 
physical implementation; the nervous system and, say, an iPhone, are real-
ized in two completely different ways. 
B. Whereas a hard drive has a phisical connection point with the com-
puter, environmental objects that interact with our mind, usually do not. 
C. Whereas the computer and the hard drive are designed by engi-
neers to be coupled in an integrated system, and the programs they run are 
programmed by computer scientists to have a reliable software interface, 
the connection between the mind and the objects in the external environ-
ment, on the contrary, is not designed but merely contingent. 
2.1. Objection A and the problem of the physical implementation 
Objection A has the following structure: 
P1: In order for one system S2 to be considered as an extension of a sys-
tem S1, S1 and S2 must share the same physical implementation. 
P2: External objects and the mind do not share the same physical imple-
mentation. 
C: Therefore, external objects cannot be considered as extension of the 
mind. 
This argument has at least three strengths. First, it is logically well-
formed. Second, it projects an induction (P1) resting upon good empirical 
evidences. Indeed, most things commonly referred to in our ordinary lan-
guage as constitutive of something, i.e. as its extensions, seem to share the 
same physical implementation of this something. For example, the extension 
to a house usually has a similar physical implementation of the house itself: 
it could be made of bricks, or cement, but it would be very strange if it were 
made of optic rays. P1 infers thus something apparently true about how 
constitutive relations are. Third, A states something prima facie self-evident 
about the metaphysics of the extended mind cases. Indeed, at least at the 
actual state of affairs of biotechnology, there are no objects sharing the same 
physical implementation of our mind as artificial neural tissue is far from 
enabling human-like cognition. 
                       





However, from the perspective of EMH, simply pointing to the imple-
mentation medium as justification (as in P1) is of no use at all to explain the 
nature of a certain function. Rather, it begs the question. The core idea of 
EMH is precisely to call into question what the implementation medium of 
cognition really is, i.e. whether it is only the nervous system or the active 
coupling between the nervous system and something else outside of it. As 
Clark & Chalmers put it, «we must find some more basic underlying differ-
ence between the two» than the mere implementation medium.37  
2.2. Objection B and the Parity Principle 
In appealing to «some more basic underlying difference» the advocates of 
EMH typically refer to a functional difference. Indeed, one further theoreti-
cal feature of EMH, besides a commitment to AE, is the endorsement of 
functionalism. In its classical definition, functionalism is the doctrine that 
what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on 
its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions in the system of 
which it is part. In the case of EMH, it is the commitment to the view that 
what makes something a constituent of the mind does not depend on its 
internal constitution, but on whether this something functions as if it were a 
constituent of the mind within a given cognitive system. This special in-
stance of functionalism is commonly known as parity principle (PP), and 
counts, in conjunction with AE, as the conceptual basis for EMH. 
In the words of Clark & Chalmers, PP says: “If, as we confront some 
task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the 
head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive 
process, than that part of the world is part of the cognitive process” (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1997, 3). 
This implies that if something outside the skull functions as part of an 
intra-cranial cognitive process, then it should be considered as part of that 
very cognitive process. Consequently, if the system executing the exoge-
nous process functions as part of the system executing the endogenous 
cognitive process, then the exogenous system must be considered as an 
extension of the endogenous one. The only condition of equivalence that 
PP postulates is for S1 and S2 to execute the same, or at least, a highly 
similar function. In force of this fact the advocates of EMH are in a good 
position not only to counter the objection A but B too. 
Let us see how: B rejects UFA on the grounds that whereas a hard 
drive has a physical connection point with the computer, environmental 
                       
37 Clark & Chalmers (1997, 10). 




objects that interact with our mind, usually do not. While A appealed to 
the implementation medium, B appeals both to the local position of S1 
and S2, and to the type of coupling established between them. Thus ac-
cording to B, in order for a system S2 to be considered as extension of a 
system S1, it must share the same local position of S1 (or, at least, be 
adjacent to it); and be interconnected with S2 in a way that resembles the 
interconnection between a computer and a peripheral device. Under these 
conditions it seems that a system S2 can count as a mind extension if and 
only if it get implanted somewhere in the central nervous system. Brain 
implants and neuroprosthetics seem to be the only systems that fulfill this 
condition. Therefore, why it can be said that neural implants are exten-
sions of the mind, the same cannot be said for smartphones or other digital 
or non-digital technologies that do not share with our brain a specific 
point of physical connection.  
However even this objection does not seem to dismiss the parity prin-
ciple since non-functional properties like local position and type of inter-
connection are considered by proponents of EMH as irrelevant in 
determining whether a system S2 might count as extension of S1 or not. 
2.3. Objection C and the reliability of coupling 
Unlike A and B, this latter objections cannot be dismissed only by appeal-
ing to the basic conceptual assumptions of EMH. Rather, to counter C a 
good defense of EMH must also involve i) a collection of empirical data; 
ii) a general reflection on theory choice in science. However, unlike 
against A and B, the advocates of EMH did not present so far any signifi-
cant counter objection against C. 
Objection C rejects UFA and, consequently, EMH, on the grounds 
that, whereas the computer and the hard drive are designed by engineers 
to be coupled in an integrated hard system, and the programs they run are 
programmed by computer scientists to have a reliable software interface, 
the connection between the mind and the objects in the external environ-
ment, is not designed. Rather it is merely contingent. Therefore, C states 
something that cannot be dismissed simply by referring to PP. In fact, this 
objection postulates, in conformity with PP, that in order for S2 to count 
as extension of S1, S1 and S2 must be integrated in the execution of the 
same function, i.e. of the same cognitive process. This integration, how-
ever, cannot be of any kind, for not all mind- environment couplings count 
as EM cases. Imagine, for instance, to cast your mind back over your ex-
girlfriend after seeing her car parked in a car park. Should then the car 




part of your mind? For cases like these, the intuitive answer seems to be 
„not at all“. The reason why such cases are unlikely to count as EM cases, 
seems to be that in such cases the coupling between environmental items 
and the mind is unreliable. Precisely this reliability of couplings is what C 
points at issue: in order a process in S2 functions as part of a process in 
S1, there must be a reliable coupling between S1 and S2.38 
But what does it mean for a coupling to be reliable? According to C in 
order a certain coupling to be reliable it must not be accidental or transi-
ent. Rather it must be designed for executing the function actually execut-
ed by the matching coupled system. Hardware and software interfaces are 
non-random in the strong sense that they are designed, built and pro-
grammed by technicians precisely to execute the function that they actual-
ly execute. They thus display a good functional reliability. Our ex-
girlfriend's car, on the contrary, is designed to provide mobility but not to 
recall items or events. Therefore its coupling with the memory process is 
accidental and transient. But what about the EM cases mentioned in the 
first section? It seems not controversial to claim that, say, the iPhone's 
phone-book is designed to store memory data, in particular phone num-
bers, for it is built and programmed precisely to execute this function. 
Similarly an external device is designed to interface the PC in the execu-
tion of a given function. So the brain-iPhone interface seems to meet the 
reliability requirement.  
One could argue that whereas the iPhone is designed for getting cou-
pled with the brain, the brain is not designed for getting coupled with the 
iPhone. In other words, unlike the computer-HDD interface is bidirection-
ally designed, it seems that all genuine EM-cases are just unidirectional. 
So whereas many environmental objects, chiefly technological artifacts, 
are designed for getting coupled with our mind, it does not go the same 
the other way round. What sense does it make to say that our mind is 
designed for coupling with a technological artefact? This question sounds 
instinctively a bit odd, as notoriously no engineer designed our mind. 
Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which the answer to this 
question should be yes. Next section will suggest that our minds may have 
been designed for extending to objects and processes in the external 
environment to a similar extent to which computers are designed for 
extending to hard drives. 
                       
38 Remember that the reliability of coupling, as noticed in the previous section, must be 
defined at the functional level. Hence, it can not depend on features such as similar physical 
implementation, local position and type of coupling 




3. AN EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT FOR THE EMH 
Natural selection is the immanent nonrandom force regulating biological 
evolution. It determines hereditary biological traits to become either more 
or less common in a population as a function of differential reproductive 
success of their bearers: in the course of generations, traits that became 
more common tend to have stable presence in a given genetic pool; 
whereas traits became less common tend to be eliminated from the gene 
pool and go extinct.  
Although genetic mutations are random, the mechanism due to which 
mutated traits either spread in the gene pool or go extinct is typically 
nonrandom. Indeed it matches the following law: traits causing the organ-
isms a better fitness for the environment where they live, tend to spread 
across generations; traits decreasing the fitness of an organism in that 
environment tend to go extinct. Traits of the first kind are called adapta-
tions and their fitness coefficient is calculated through their reproductive 
success. For this reason, natural selection implies that virtually all heredi-
tary biological traits in the actual biosphere are supposed to determine a 
certain amount of fitness advantage, or at least not to determine disad-
vantage; otherwise they had gone extinct. In operating this way, natural 
selection shapes organism phenotypes and, consequently, the matching 
gene pools. In conformity with the established lexicon of evolutionary 
biology, evolution designs organisms and their functions for making them 
adapted to a certain environment, as it, over long intervals of time, selects 
the genes responsible for organism phenotype and behavioral functionali-
ty.  
My argument here is that the mind may have been selected for extend-
ing to the external environment. This would imply that the coupling 
between the mind and things in the environment is functionally reliable in 
the strong sense that it is non-random, but designed by evolution for 
executing adaptive functions, whose implementation increased our fitness 
coefficient in our environment.39  
This argument moves in two steps. First, I will show why EM should 
evolve. Second, I will show why it is reasonable to call such a evolution-
ary trait EM.  
                       
39 With this argument I am not necessarily committing myself to the claim that the property of 
being designed for equals the property of being reliable -and I am confident there might be 
cases that could falsify this claim. My argument indeed is also compatible with the more 




3.1. The Natural Selection of Cognitive Faculties 
As previously pointed out, in order one trait to evolve through natural 
selection it must turn out to be adaptively advantageous. Being adaptively 
advantageous, however, is a variable criterion. One trait may indeed be 
advantageous in many respects. It may, for example, simply produce the 
minimal advantage of optimizing the organism’s internal structure or func-
tion, such as better regulating its metabolism. Or it may determine a wide 
range of favorable adaptive outcomes (metabolic, ecological, behavioral 
etc.). The more complex a trait is, in more respects it must result adaptively 
advantageous. In recent years, evolutionary biologists have set the follow-
ing list of adaptive criteria that a certain cognitive faculty should meet in 
order to make its selection evolutionary predictable:40 
• Optimization in system internal organization 
o Optimization in system metabolic equilibrium 
o Optimization in input processes 
o Positive feedback on other system faculties 
• Optimization in system output patterns 
o Refinement in output accuracy 
o Refinement in behavioral patterns 
o Increase in interaction success with the ecological niche 
My claim that our mind may be designed for extending must thus be 
proven by showing whether or not EM meets the criteria listed above. 
This will be at issue in the next paragraphs. 
3.1.1. Internal organization 
The ability to extend some cognitive processes to the external envi-
ronment may have determined an optimization in our internal system 
organization in three important ways. First, it may have produced a better 
metabolic equilibrium. Cognitive systems are dissipative systems that get 
pushed into operation by harnessing energy from a variety of metabolic 
pathways. The human brain, in particular, is one of the most dissipating 
systems of the biosphere, for it claims only 2% of our body mass, but is 
responsible for approximately 20% of our body oxygen consumption. For 
a cognitive system, therefore, energy must be constantly available for 
work (such as mechanical work) or for other processes (such as chemical 
synthesis and anabolic processes).  
However, energy is for a system not always easily available. Food, for 
                       
40 This list is a personal elaboration of Geary (2005) and Striedter (2005). 




instance, our best resource to assimilate some of the essential nutrients 
that our cells convert in energy, is often scant. For this reason, evolution 
has favored those organisms capable to spark their life-maintaining pro-
cesses with the lower possible expenditure of chemical energy. According 
to a basic principle in bio-energetics thus, all living systems try to execute 
their biological processes with the smallest effort/profit ratio, namely to 
obtain the best possible outcome with the lowest possible energy expense. 
Now, it seems that one of the easiest ways the nervous system has to 
achieve the smallest effort/profit ratio is by transferring some processes 
from the neurons to the environment, as the environment does not draw on 
our internal energy resources. In integrating some external objects in the 
cognitive loop, the mind off-loads onto these objects not only a certain 
amount of information, but a certain amount of chemical energy necessary 
for that information processing too. It thus behaves like a car exploiting a 
slope to reduce gasoline consumption. This evolutionary conjecture may 
accurately be proven experimentally. By means of in vivo magnetic 
resonance spectroscopy (MRS), indeed, we can follow the metabolic 
pathways of energy production (as glucose oxidation) and work (as moni-
tored by the cycling of glutamate and GABA neurotransmitters). Further-
more, by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we could 
measure and localize small differences in neuronal activities between the 
extended and the unextended mode. Although specific neuroimaging 
experiments are still required, it seems reasonable to predict the cognitive 
off-load to things in the environment to determine a lower energy con-
sumption for the same reason why driving a scooter for 10 miles deter-
mines a lower energy consumption than walking for the same length, as 
the process is mostly executed by the external system. 
Behavioral biology and ethology also offer interesting data. Take for 
instance honey bee communication. Foragers honey bees use two sign 
language systems to communicate with their hive mates. By means of one 
of these languages, the so-called waggle dance, they share information 
about the direction and distance to patches of flowers yielding nectar and 
pollen, to water sources, or to new housing locations.41 
Not all shared information is internally processed, for information such 
as the direction to the source is a function of the bee movement path and 
the hive spacial position. Instead of encoding complex (and metabolically 
expensive) information, forager bee's evolution has most likely favored 
the off-load of such information to physical objects in the environment 
and their subsequent functional re-integration in the cognitive loop. While 
performing the waggle dance, the bee's mind extends to the hive, for the 
                       




hive becomes constitutive of the process executed by the bee's mind. This 
adaptive off-load is supposed by many ethologists to be very close to the 
smallest effort/profit ratio evolutionary attainable, for it enables the bees 
to accurately share fundamental information with the lowest possible level 
of neural complexity (hence, with the lowest possible expenditure of 
chemical energy).42  
The same goes for some cognitive systems of mammals, such as the 
bat echolocation system. Bats emit calls out to the environment and listen 
to the echoes of those calls that return from various objects near them. 
They use these echoes to locate and identify the objects and themselves. 
This is also a clearly extended process, for it works if and only if bats 
exploit the external environment to reflect acoustic waves. Executing the 
same function internally would have been evolutionary too expensive, for 
it would have required the implementation of an internal surface acoustic 
wave reflector.43 
Optimization of the internal organization does not operate exclusively 
at the biochemical level, but at the functional level too. In order for a 
system to be functionally optimized in evolutionary terms, hence to have a 
high statistical probability of propagating to next generations, it must turn 
out to be able i) to execute more functions than its unoptimized matching 
system; ii) to execute the functions of its unoptimized matching system 
more efficiently.  
I would argue that in the case of EM both conditions are satisfied. In 
the first place, through extending to the external environment, the mind 
become capable of executing more cognitive functions than if it were 
confined within the boundaries of the skull. For example, when the human 
mind is coupled with an ultrasonography system, as it often happens with 
the minds of oceanographers, it becomes capable of processing a kind of 
information, i.e. ultrasounds, that it would not be able to process other-
wise, for their frequency is greater than our mind's biological upper pro-
cessing limit. More commonly, when we couple our mind with a 
computer connected to the internet, as we use to do every day, then we 
make available to our mind a huge amount of data −such as e.g. what the 
weather in Hanoi is like, how to get to the next subway station, how many 
calories a banana has, what Fellini's first film was etc.− that the decoupled 
mind would usually not have access to. This functional advantage does 
not only pertain to couplings with sophisticated technologies, but to 
simple artifacts and even to parts of the physical body too. All school 
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students know, for instance, that thanks to the use of pen and paper people 
can perform complex arithmetical, algebraical and geometrical operations 
that they struggle more to solve if they would only lean on internal re-
sources. The same goes for children counting fingers on their own hand44 
as well as for the cognitive features of many non-human species. As we 
have seen, honey bees would not be able to inform their mates about the 
source direction if they could not lean on external resources such as the 
hive and the sun position. Therefore, it is likely that evolution has favored 
those organisms whose mind was able to extend to the external environ-
ment in order to gain not only metabolic equilibrium, but cognitive im-
provement too. 
Extended systems may also work more efficiently than their matching 
unextended systems. When it comes to cognitive processes 'efficiency' is 
basically calculated in terms of processing speed and outcome accuracy.45  
Extended systems turn out to be more efficient than unextended ones, 
as they enable, under many circumstances, to process information faster 
and to produce more accurate outcomes. Kirsh & Maglio, for example, 
notoriously calculated that the physical rotation of a shape in the computer 
game Tetris goes about three times faster than the mental rotation of the 
same shape.46 
This reveals external processing to be, at least under some conditions, 
dramatically faster than internal processing. The same can be said, again, 
for mathematical operations. Just try to do your maths homework both 
with and without calculator (or pen & paper set): you will suddenly notice 
a dramatic difference in the time it takes to work them out. Moreover, 
leaning on external supports does not only increase the processing speed, 
but the outcome accuracy too. To show this it is not difficult to find men-
tal experiments taken from our every-day life: compare the accuracy in 
the process of dealing the correct phone number of your boyfriend both by 
trying to bring it to your mind and by finding it in the phone-book of your 
mobile phone.47  
It is worth to point out that it is a common place in evolutionary biolo-
gy to consider processing speed and outcome accuracy as fundamental 
features in determining the fitness rate of an organism. Suppose two 
different homo sapiens populations were both migrating from an arid to a 
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prosperous region along the same track; they both know that at some point 
of the track there is a life- threatening danger like a colony of malaria-
carrying anopheles or a pack of hyenas, but only one of the two groups 
used external cognitive strategies such as tracking the course on a hand-
held support or marking trees and stones to remember the exact location 
of the danger. Given that leaning on external resources increases outcome 
accuracy, it is more likely for the group tracking the course or marking 
trees to survive and thus reach the prosperous land than for the group 
leaning exclusively on internal memory. Therefore, it is in principle likely 
that evolution has selected those individuals able to exploit external 
resources by integrating them within their own mind's cognitive loop.  
One further way the natural selection of extended minds may have oc-
curred is by sparking off a positive feedback effect on internal cognition. 
This means: developing some extended cognitive strategies may improve 
the effectiveness of the unextended processes too. A good example is 
natural language.48 
Evolutionary psycholinguists agree that, since verbal communication 
first appeared about 120.000 years ago among the individuals of our 
species, it suddenly exerted a massive impact on our putatively non-verbal 
processes such as categorization, memory, visual discrimination, and even 
simply detecting the presence of a stimulus.49  
From the point of view of EM this means, that a putatively extended 
cognitive process may not only be effective as such, but may have in-
creased the effectiveness of internal processes too. It is, therefore, reason-
able to argue that evolution might have favored those organisms that are 
capable to implement cognitive processes by exerting positive feedback 
on other processes. Another instance of this evolutionary phenomenon is 
the improvement in the accuracy of beliefs in consequence of long-term 
memory development. This phenomenon occurred gradually in the evolu-
tion of the human species during the Pleistocene, in consequence of the 
growth of hippocampal volumes, and can still be observed in Alzheimer’s 
and Parkinson’s disease patients. In these patients, memory reduction 
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caused by loss of neurons and synapses in the cerebral cortex systemati-
cally leads to a deficit in belief accuracy. For example, a patient prone to 
forget, say, the name of his daughter Amy, will also be more likely to 
have the false belief that her daughter's name is Laura. Insofar as it mas-
sively expanded our memory by off-loading amounts of information to 
external resources, the evolution of EM has also improved the accuracy of 
our beliefs. For example, the probability of having the true belief that 
Ashgabat is the capital of Turkmenistan is significantly higher when our 
mind is reliably coupled with external online resources such as Wikipedia, 
than in the decoupled mode. Now, it is not difficult to see how increasing 
the probability of having true beliefs is adaptively favorable. 
 Just consider the case of beliefs such as that cobras are venomous 
snakes, that tetanus infection occurs through wound contamination, or that 
inbreeding leads to a higher probability of congenital birth defects. Hav-
ing such true beliefs as consequence of coupling our mind with external 
artifacts (before Wikipedia this function was executed by books, codes 
and norms) to attain shared social knowledge was for our ancestors a 
dramatic adaptive advantage, for it enabled them to avoid potential harms. 
Still nowadays, coupling our mind with external resources such as books, 
computers, websites etc. enables us to massively increase our survival 
rate, since it provides fundamental information for supporting life-
maintaining processes, such as information about healthy diet, child care, 
how to avoid the transmission of infectious diseases and so on. 
3.1.2. External Organization 
In order to become a stable adaptation a cognitive faculty such as EM 
must not only guarantee an optimization in the system internal organiza-
tion but in system output patterns too. In fact, what ultimately counts in 
evolutionary terms lies in behavior production, as evolution selects organ-
isms for how they behave. This does not imply the system internal pro-
cesses to be unimportant. Rather they are evolutionary relevant as they 
produce different behavioral patterns upon which natural selection acts by 
determining differential reproductive success. If a well-optimized cogni-
tive process was not correlated to certain behavioral patterns, it would 
have no evolutionary significance. Vice versa no complex adaptive behav-
ioral pattern may be independent of internal processing. Faster and more 
accurate input processing is, therefore, evolutionary significant for it 
determines faster and more accurate behavioral responses. Reducing the 
time interval between detecting the presence of a stimulus and producing 




ment organisms are constantly asked to develop survival strategies under 
time pressure. Imagine once again our ancestors in one of the many eco-
logical niches they colonized in the late Pleistocene, facing an animal 
threat, such as a lion. Such a situation requires a very rapid behavioral 
response priming the animal for fighting or fleeing. Since EM may in-
crease the rapidity of an organism’s behavioral response, as we discussed 
above, it might well be an adaptation. 
Furthermore, by integrating parts of the environment in the cognitive 
loop, the extended mind is supposed to provide the organism with a better 
interaction with its own ecological niche. In other words, being the envi-
ronment itself in the cognitive loop, the organism-world coupling is 
supposed to be more successful. Take for example fish locomotion. Many 
fishes of the order Perciformes, such as the yellow-fin tuna, as well as 
some marine mammals such as dolphins, can swim at speeds that can 
exceed that of gravity by about 20 times. Moreover, they can reverse 
direction without slowing down and with a turning radius only 10 to 30% 
of the length of their bodies. Although they basically depend on this 
locomotive speed and aquatic agility for their survival, these adaptive 
features do not rest, as one would think, on piscine propulsion nor on 
purely internal cognitive strategies. Muscular and fin system, indeed, are 
insufficient both for their flexibility and propelling power to explain such 
astonishing behavioral properties: it has been calculated, for instance, that 
dolphins are too weak by a factor of about 7, to attain such speeds. In 
addition, would the fish exclusively rely on its internal resources to 
achieve these records, then the expenditure of energy would be too high 
for its metabolism. This gives rise to a paradox, known as the Gray's 
paradox, whose inescapable solution is that there are flow mechanisms at 
work around the body of the moving dolphin that lower its drag by a 
factor of 7. In other words, to achieve their behavioral records dolphins 
massively exploit the aquatic environment around them, off-loading to the 
water the exercise of some functions that are intuitively supposed to be 
intrinsic of their bodies. Swimming at 50 knots and reversing with a 
turning radio of 25%, therefore, are records that the dolphin can only 
obtain through integrated coupling between itself and the aquatic envi-
ronment. By means of this off-load aquatic animals augment their adap-
tive coefficient not only in consequence of the improvement of their skills 
(such as speed and agility), but in consequence of the refinement of cou-
pling with their own environment too. By integrating external features 
such as water pressure, salinity gradient, fluid temperature, current inten-
sity and direction, aquatic animals also refine their interaction with the 
ecological niche where they live.  
Successful coupling with the environment requires deep (personal and 




sub-personal) knowledge of that environment. In force of this knowledge, 
they get more capable to develop successful survival strategies not only in 
the standard situation, but also when dangerous changes in the environ-
ment occur. It has been noted, for instance, that in case a threat in the 
environment occurs, such as a crude oil spill in the ocean, fishes and 
dolphins can detect it before the oil invades their optical space.  
Although further studies are required, an elegant explanation of this 
phenomenon is to assume that fishes and dolphins, in force of their well-
optimized coupling with and knowledge of the aquatic environment, can 
detect physical changes in the water, such as in the hydrocarbon level or 
in the water pressure, and correlate them to a life-threatening danger 
before to see the oil, similarly as how they can avoid collisions with boats 
by rapidly detecting a change in current direction and intensity. In a very 
similar way honey bees, insofar as they integrate external objects such as 
the hive and the sun position in their cognitive loop, display an astonish-
ing skill at sense of direction and sense of time. It is thus probable for 
evolution to have primed individuals to succeed in coupling with external 
objects to better interact with their environment. 
4. EMH AND THE SYSTEMATICS OF THE SCIENCES 
The evolutionary argument sketched above lays itself open to the criticism 
that it does not empirically prove EMH to be true but simply corroborates 
it based on evolutionary theory.  
However, Richard Dawkins and other authors have argued that it is 
conceptually improbable to find a kind of any empirical evidence or 
experimental design that could uncontroversially prove that the mind-
environment couplings responsible for this presumably adaptive off-load 
of cognitive processes outside the organism's nervous system, should 
count de facto as extensions (i.e. constitutive components) of the mind 
itself. Determining whether they count as extensions or not, does not seem 
to be an issue that can be assessed with empirical observation, but rather 
seems to be a matter of conceptual definitions. It is worth to point out that 
conceding this does not imply to maintain that the attribute 'extended' 
referred to the mind is arbitrary after all. Not being subjected to ultimate 
empirical proof is a condition that scientific propositions may incur at a 
high level of abstraction. However this does not make the choice among 
them a matter of mere subjective taste.  
Rather, according to the basic principles of theory choice in science, in 
absence of ultimate empirical proof, the justification of a given hypothesis 




(law of parsimony); 2) the grade of compatibility of the hypothesis with 
the overall scientific paradigm (law of conservatism). My claim here is 
that, considering the external off-loading of (phases of) internal processes 
as extensions of the mind is heuristically suitable for it meets both princi-
ples for theory choice in science, given the absence of ultimate empirical 
proof. I will therefore commit myself to the claim that EMH is more 
suitable than its antagonist hypothesis. 
First of all, EMH is more suitable than unextended accounts of cogni-
tions because it makes fewer assumptions and thereby offers the simplest 
explanation for mind-environment coupling. And other things being equal, 
a simpler explanation is better than a more complex one. EMH, in fact, 
displays the explanatory advantage of admitting only one system for the 
execution of an environment-involving cognitive function. Whilst tradi-
tional views attribute the execution of a given function, say the recall of a 
phone number stored on the iPhone, to two different decoupled systems, 
i.e. the mind and the iPhone, EMH attributes this function to the sole 
integrated system composed of the active coupling of the mind with the 
iPhone. This assumption is particularly valuable in behavioral perspective, 
for it allows to avoid decoupled explanations for complex adaptive behav-
ior. For example it allows to attribute the honey bee waggle dance only to 
the extended mind of the bee instead of to the bee's unextended mind, the 
hive and the sun position. 
Secondly, EMH is more suitable than its antagonist hypotheses be-
cause it is more compatible with the current scientific systematics. Indeed, 
as the evolutionary argument should have shown, EMH is more compati-
ble with the default description of adaptive features. In fact, insofar as it is 
self-evident for evolutionary biologists to consider adaptations such as 
lactose tolerance as adaptations of the digestive system, and bipedalism as 
an adaptation of the muskulo-skeletal system, then there seem to be no 
impediment for considering the ability to performing environment-
involving functional coupling as an adaptation of the mind. But if the 
adaptation of performing environment-involving functional coupling is a 
constitutive feature of the mind, then all components concurring in the 
realization of this function must be constitutive of the mind. Translated 
into the EMH vocabulary: the mind extends to them. Evolutionary biolo-
gy, in other words, presupposes the existence of adaptive functions and 
matching systems executing such functions. Systems executing adaptive 
functions are considered holistically, regardless either of whether their 
constituents are all internal or whether some of them reside externally. 
Furthermore, EMH is explanatory more compatible with the general 
scientific paradigm because it provides a description of cognitive faculties 
of living systems at the functional level. Explanations in ethology and 




behavioral psychology, for instance, use to attribute cognitive behavioral 
patterns, such as ant spatial cognition, chimpanzee’s rule-learning and 
octopus’ tool use, to the organism performing such behavioral patterns: 
respectively the ant, the chimpanzee and the octopus. There seems to be 
no reason then, not to attribute the cognitive behavioral pattern of integrat-
ing objects in the environment within the cognitive loop of the organism, 
to the organism itself. But attributing a cognitive function to a certain 
organism implies by definition to attribute it to the mind of that organism. 
And attributing processes involving mind-environment functional cou-
plings to the mind of the organism implies ceteris paribus a commitment 
to the idea that the mind may extend to the environment. Denying EMH, 
therefore, would contravene the principle of conservatism in the strong 
sense that it would bring up the default description of behavioral patterns 
at the functional level. For example, it would imply either not to consider 
the honey bee waggle dance as a behavioral pattern of the bee or even not 
to consider it a behavioral pattern at all. Neither of these options seems to 
be heuristically attractive. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper attempted to historically situate the Extended Mind Hypothesis 
(EMH) in a broader landscape of philosophical and scientific ideas and 
theories about the mind. Furthermore, it presented an argument in support 
of EMH. The argument consisted of two sub-arguments, an evolutionary 
and a systematic one. The evolutionary sub-argument advanced that there is 
good empirical and analytic reason to suppose that the mind is designed 
by natural selection to extend. The systematic argument stated that EMH is 
more consistent with the current systematics of science and scientific tax-
onomy as it better complies with the principles of parsimony and conserva-
tism. In force of the connection between these sub-arguments, I have 
concluded that EMH is epistemically advantageous compared to purely 
internalist accounts of cognition.  
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